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1.	Introduction                                                                                                                                          
	For the last three years, members of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) have debated new proposals (1) for revised  protective action levels (PALS) to assess human-health effects of ionizing radiation and (2) for its first-ever protection of the non-human environment from ionizing radiation.  Both sets of proposals focus on the merits of alternative hypotheses about the shape of the dose-response curve for biological effects of ionizing radiation.  
	The controversy over the ICRP PALS and environmental proposals is fueled, on the one hand, by fears of nuclear power and of a repetition of the Chernobyl accident and, on the other hand, by desires to cut costs in weapons clean-up and reactor decommissioning. The academic-medical scientists tend to be aligned on one side of the conflicts, whereas industrial-military scientists tend to be aligned on the other.

 2. Overview
	Specifically, this paper argues that the scientific methods behind the ICRP PALS proposals are flawed in at least 5 ways.  (1) They ignore problems of scale. (2) They propose trimming the data in ways that lead to inconsistent theory. (3) Their aggregation of dose data is incomplete. (4) They adopt an inconsistent position regarding measurability of dose. (5) They misuse the metascientific criterion of simplicity.  The paper also shows that the scientific methods behind the ICRP recommendations for environmental protection are  flawed in at least 4 ways: (1) They take an incomplete approach to ecological risk assessment.  (2) They employ arbitrary selection criteria for “reference species,” criteria that are easily manipulated (therefore subjective). (3) They employ unclear, non-transparent techniques not capable of reliable replication and therefore susceptible to subjective manipulation. (4) They reject direct measurement and, exposure standards for the abiotic environment. 

3. The 2001 ICRP PALS Proposals and 2002 ICRP Environmental Proposals
	This year, the ICRP has made two new sets of proposals (2002 PALS propoals and 2002 environmental proposals) for radiological protection, both based on amended understanding of the biological dose-response curve for ionizing radiation. The PALS proposals were designed to make radiation protection more consistent, complete, scientifically defensible, and simple (ICRP 2002b).  Essentially these PALS proposals did two things.  First, they defined collective radiation dose as an unjustified, nonempirical “construct” and argued for defining radiation dose purely in terms of individuals.  Collective dose is the principle, used for the past half century, whereby radiation biologists affirm that the detriment (caused by ionizing radiation), like cancer, is a function of the dose to the tissues. Because there is no threshold for risk from ionizing radiation (only 35 eV can scramble DNA), and because the dose-response curve is accepted to be linear with no threshold, a large dose X of ionizing radiation to a small number of people Y is taken to cause the same degree of detriment (by ionization tracks through cells) as a smaller dose X/z of ionizing radiation to a larger number of people Yz.  The notion of convertible detriment is what is essential to collective dose, where collective dose X/z toYz people causes the same detriment as dose X to Y people.  According to the theory behind collective dose, X exposure to 10 people causes the same biological effect as X/10 exposure to 1 person. Second, they specified different parts of the radiation dose-response curve on the basis of different protective actions that ought to be taken in response to them.  According to this specification, the lowest exposures, for which no action was said to be necessary, were said to be negligible and could be discounted. 
	In August 2002, the Environment Committee of the ICRP posted (on its website www.icrp.org/draft_nonhuman.htm) (​http:​/​​/​www.icrp.org​/​draft_nonhuman.htm)​) the first-ever draft recommendations for radiological protection for the environment and called for comments, before the end of the year, from the international scientific community (ICRP 2002a). The 2002 ICRP proposals centered on 4 explicit moves.  First, they called for environmental protection based only on doses to given “reference” species, rather than also based on releases to the abiotic environment (air, water).  Second, they specified the doses largely in terms of unconfirmed models, rather than actual empirical dose measurements.  Third, they ignored radiological effects on larger systems, such as ecosystem structures and functions, and fourth, they proposed adopting the 2002 PALS proposals in environmental protection.
	Although nuclear critics might point to the values apparently driving the proposals (they were made at the behest of the nuclear industry; they were made mainly by those in the employ of the global nuclear industry; they allow more lenient standards for radiological cleanup; they allow manipulation of doses by vested interests; they avoid direct measurements that could document severe radiological contamination; and they result in avoiding costly pollution control), both the PALS and the environment proposals are more obviously, factually, and clearly susceptible to criticism on metascientific grounds.  This paper shows that the PALS proposals are scientifically flawed in at least 5 ways and the environmental proposals are scientifically flawed in at least 4 ways.  If the arguments in the paper are correct, one need not resort to question-begging attacks on scientists’ intentions, their funders, or their ethics.  Instead one can decide the plausibility of the case on metascientific grounds alone.  The paper also encourages philosophers of science and scientists to read the relevant documents and to respond, on the ICRP website, to these flawed proposals.

4. Metascience
	But how might one decide the plausibility of the ICRP case on metascientific grounds?  Following J.O. Wisdom (1987, vii), one can assume that ‘metascience’ has the same meaning as ‘methodology,’ and thus that a metascientific investigation is a methodological inquiry.  Moreover, it is a methodological inquiry conducted with the tools of logic and science, but an inquiry that takes place after one has given a typical scientific explanation.  For example, as Wisdom notes, one possible scientific explanation of why a man lights a cigarette is force of habit.  Metascientific explanations arise when one asks, afterward, why his lighting the cigarette is a force of habit.  They arise when one asks for an account of the dispositions, the practices of rule following, or the habits themselves.  Thus, metascientific inquiries focus on “two types of questions, namely ‘what is the explanation of the rules?’ and ‘why do people accept them?’” (Wisdom 1987, 24-25).  Some of the metascientific issues discussed under the first question include whether scientific development is discontinuous or whether its explanations are genuinely autonomous.  A metascientific issue central to the second question is how to defend science as rational (Halfmann 1984, 153).
	As it is often understood, metascience has at least two functions, with only one of which this paper is concerned.  The ideological function is to defend science against external threats to its consistency and empirical procedures.  The technical function, with which this paper is concerned, is to preserve the cognitive and empirical standards that ought to characterize good science.  Concerned as it is with this practical focus, the paper takes no position on the metascientific conflicts between, for example, proponents of the logistic view and advocates of the structural view, or between model theorists and set theorists (see, for example, Pearce and Rontala 1983).  Nor does it take any position on the metascientific debates between, for example, eliminativists and identicists (see Maffie 1995).  (Eliminativists reject epistemology in lieu of successor sciences such as neurosciences, whereas identicists reject any epistemology except the self-evaluative practices of science).  Model theorists, set theorists, eliminativists, identicists, and others ought to be able to agree, in this particular case, that my criticisms of ICRP recommendations are justified.
	Proposing to make radiological protection more scientific, consistent, simple, and coherent with the empirical data, the ICRP PALS proposals divide different levels of additional, human-caused radiation exposure into different classes, based purely on quantity of exposure.  Next they define some exposures as “negligible,” because they are on the order of background exposure (ICRP 2002b; Clarke 1999), even though all background exposures themselves are risky, and there is no threshold for dangerous effects of radiation on biota (ICRP 1991; NCRP 1993).  
	As such, the PALS proposals presuppose an interpretation of the radiobiological dose-response curve that is scientifically flawed.  They have at least 5 serious problems, which the paper considers in order. (1) They ignore problems of scale. (2) They propose trimming the data in ways that lead to inconsistent theory. (3) Their aggregation of dose data is incomplete. (4) They adopt an inconsistent position regarding measurability of dose. (5) They misuse the metascientific criterion of simplicity. 

4.1 Ignoring the Scale of Human Exposure
	A key scientific difficulty with the presupposed dose-response curve in both the ICRP proposals is that they ignore scale; they allege that the same radiation dose is no more harmful if one, as opposed to 1000, living beings is exposed to it, because the harm to any individual is no greater in one case than in the other.  How do the PALS proposals justify their ignoring scale?  They accept only the concept of individual dose and reject the concept of collective dose, already explained earlier in section 3.  The collective-dose principle has been used for decades because radiobiologists know that the amount of damage caused by ionizing radiation is a function of amount of energy deposition in a given quantity of matter (ICRP 1991).  All things being equal, the greater the dose, the greater the molecular-level disruptions of the cell being irradiated.  More generally, because effects of ionizing radiation are additive, cumulative, and linear with no threshold, all radiation dose-response curves, to date, have presupposed that if one individual receives enough radiation (dose d) to cause at least 1 cancer, then if x individuals each receive radiation dose d/x, this dose also will cause at least 1 cancer among the x people, in part because one-fourth of the x individuals will include especially sensitive individuals and in part because of the stochastic effects of radiation exposures (ICRP 1991).
	Instead of assuming that biological response r to a given dose d of radiation is constant, as the collective-dose principle presupposes, so that (for example) the effects of 1 person’s receiving dose d are the same as 10 persons’ each receiving dose d/10, the PALS proposals reject collective dose.  They argue that collective radiation dose is an unjustified, nonempirical “construct,” (a) because each of these individual doses is not actually measured, (b) because effects of very small doses of radiation are negligible and often repaired by the body, and (c) because the need for protective action is influenced by the individual dose, but not by the number of exposed individuals (ICRP 2002b, 118).  As a result, the ICRP proposals ignore all collective-dose contributions to cumulative individual radiation dose.  Instead, they focus only on the highest doses to particular individuals and they presuppose that scale is not important in the radiation dose-response curve (ICRP 2002b, 117).  
	For example, suppose 1 person receives (what the ICRP calls) a “trivial”  dose of radiation, 0.05 mSv (or 5 mrem), for which the ICRP (2002b, 119-120) proposes that no protective action is necessary.  Suppose, on the other hand, that 10,000 people receive this same additional dose. If the ICRP is correct in ignoring the scale of exposure, then the two exposures have the same biomedical effects.  But the effects arguably are not the same because larger populations, like the 10,000 exposed people, have larger numbers of sensitive individuals and people with prior high exposures from things such as x-rays and radiation therapy, and therefore higher long-term risks.   In the case of low-dose radiation exposure, scale effects are important because the greater the number of individuals exposed to the same dose, all things being equal, the greater the probability of germline effects in subsequent generations (Dubrova et al 1996).  In other words, carcinogenic and other genetic effects increase as a function of scale.  That is one reason, for example, the US Public Health Service halted its practice, half a century ago, of checking for tuberculosis by doing portable x-ray screening of thousands of rural US children.  
	In ignoring effects of scale, the ICRP proposals fly in the face of documented scale effects in a variety of sciences.  For example, economists are familiar with economies of scale.  And ecologists know that some effects occur only at the ecosystem level, but not at the species level.  And risk assessors agree  that average expected utility misrepresents loss/harm for low-probability, high-consequence events, precisely because of the effects of scale; all things being equal, large-consequence, or large-scale events do more damage than the same number of individual events’ harming the same number of people.  That is why analysts typically weight some low-probability exposure to a very large group by a factor n, in order to account for the fact that even small risks to large numbers of people cause more detriment than imposing the same risk on a single person (see Shrader-Frechette 1991). Ignoring collective dose ignores these fundamental scalar effects.

4.2 Trimming the Data 
	The new ICRP proposals also fall short of good science, which  requires that one should not ignore any relevant information because they presuppose what the English mathematician Charles Babbage called “trimming the data.”  Ignoring the various exposures arising from collective doses from various sources, as the ICRP has proposed to do, means that all the contributions of radiation exposure, to a particular person’s dose, will not be counted.  As a result, the ICRP proposals fail to base their recommendations on total exposures.  One can establish this incompleteness by the following considerations:

(A) I can determine my total individual dose of radiation only by adding all the doses I receive from each source.
(B) But the new ICRP proposals tell me not to add those doses that I receive (as a member of a collective-dose population) from weapons testing, Chernobyl, and various other sources.
	(C)Therefore the new ICRP proposals prevent me from learning my total individual dose, because they ignore collective doses that I receive as a member of a large group

	If (A), (B), and (C) are correct, then the ICRP proposals (to abandon collective dose) trim the dose data. They also are inconsistent in admitting the need for collective-dose calculations for workers, but denying the need for collective-dose calculations for the public (ICRP 2002b, 117).  Because many members of the public (those who receive x-rays or cancer treatment, for example) have radiation exposures that are as great as, or greater than, those of nuclear workers, it is inconsistent to calculate the collective dose for workers but not for the public.  By admitting the need for collective doses in the worker case, the ICRP has admitted that even small exposures are additively or cumulatively important and ought to be monitored.  It is thus inconsistent for the ICRP proposals to reject dose additivity in the collective dose of the public, but to accept dose additivity in the collective dose of workers.  This inconsistency also betrays an inconsistency regarding the linear, no threshold (LNT) hypothesis.  The ICRP proposals accept LNT and additivity for workers but deny LNT and additivity for the public.  Such an inconsistency is incompatible with good science because the ionizing radiation behaves in the same way in both the worker and public cases.
		As a consequence of trimming the dose data by partially abandoning the concept of collective dose, and instead considering only doses to individuals (presumably nearby in space and time), the ICRP proposals actually may promote a “disperse and dilute” or “higher-smokestack” strategy.   This strategy is to use radiological emission and effluent techniques (such as poorer radwaste canisters) that send the exposures to people farther away in space and time.  By ignoring collective dose and sending effluents/emissions farther away, one can claim that no known individuals receive a significant dose, and therefore that such doses need not be counted.  Yet if there are radiological releases, even if they are not counted as part of individual doses, obviously the radiological burden for the planet will be increased, just as it was for weapons testing. Given the cumulative and no-threshold character of the effects of radiation exposure and the long half-lives of many radionuclides, this instance of trimming the dose data could actually lead to increased doses.
		The fact that no nation will monitor individual doses, in the way required by the new ICRP proposals, also suggests that actual doses are likely to increase and to be undetected. Indeed, even in the developed world, it is difficult to keep track of medical records that are far easier and less expensive to obtain than radiation-dose records. Such radiation records also would be more difficult to obtain and maintain (than collective-dose records based on emissions and effluents) because of individual variations among people and the need for continual individual monitoring.  That is why most pollution-control regulations are written in terms of emission or effluent standards, not merely in terms of individual-dose standards, as the new ICRP proposals are.
		Because of the practical difficulties with monitoring individual doses, the new ICRP proposals will have either to estimate individual doses or to use average doses.   It has said it will do the latter (ICRP 2002b, 122).  Yet both these alternatives are undesirable.  Estimation is undesirable because it could be manipulated or misused by those having an interest in showing alleged low doses.  Using average doses is undesirable both because it is dependent on the model and distribution chosen, and because using average doses fail to reflect detriment to the most sensitive segments of the population.  Average dose figures also could cover up high doses to especially sensitive people, such as children.

	4.3 Ignoring Background Radiation
		By virtue of proposing a dose-response curve presupposing that natural background radiation levels are acceptable (see ICRP 2002b, 119-120), the ICRP defines science in terms of an ethical norm, (the acceptability of background radiation levels) and notes approvingly that a majority of the ICRP members agreed with the use of natural background radiation in interpreting the dose-response curve.  But just because background radiation of a certain level is natural or normal does not mean that it is benign or desirable, as the ICRP presupposes. Some experts say that even 1 mSv of background radiation is responsible for 1 in 40 fatal cancers (UNSCEAR 1994; Gonzalez 1994), and background radiation is typically several times greater than 1 mSv.  If they are correct, if all exposures to ionizing radiation carry a small risk, then background radiation ought not be used as a normative criterion for what is supposed to be purely scientific.
		If one wished to argue that additional radiation exposures, below background, were negligible or trivial, then one could just as easily argue, for example, that particular cases of typhus or tuberculosis were negligible or trivial, provided that they were below the normal level of either disease.  Obviously, normalcy neither entails that causing additional cases of typhus or tuberculosis nor causing additional radiation exposures, always is acceptable.  Accepting such an interpretation of the radiation dose-response curve, would deter medical and scientific progress.  They could deter medical progress because one could claim all preventable biomedical risks or harms were acceptable if they were below the normal level.  They could deter scientific progress because ignoring additional small doses of ionizing radiation could contaminate and bias control groups used in epidemiological studies of radiation effects.

4.4 Subjective Judgments and Inconsistency Regarding Measurability 
	Apart from trimming the dose data, because of ignoring collective and background doses of radiation, the new PALS proposals are scientifically questionable because instead they base decisions regarding allowable dose levels on “judgment” (ICRP 2002b, 120).  It is not consistent for the ICRP to fault collective dose for not being measurable (ICRP 2002b, 117), but then to propose subjective judgment as the alternative to collective dose (2002b, 120).  By calling doses “negligible” or “trivial” in PALS, the ICRP proposals also are inconsistent in using a common-sense criterion for negligibility: what seems small.  Clearly, from a scientific point of view, there is no “negligible” or trivial dose, given that all doses increase the probability of harm.  The new ICRP proposals likewise inconsistently reject collective dose for the public, in part because it is not measurable (ICRP 2002b, 117), yet (as already mentioned) accept it for workers, although the worker case has the same measurability problems.  Similarly, it is inconsistent for the ICRP to reject collective dose as not measurable but to propose using table 2 and PALs that are, on its own admission, dependent on (nonmeasurable) judgment (ICRP 2002b, 120). 
	By rejecting collective dose because it is not directly measurable, the ICRP (2002b, 117) also is inconsistent with scientific reliance on nonmeasurable and nonobservable quantities. No one has seen quarks, for example, but virtually all high-energy physicists believe they exist.  Neutrinos were believed to exist for some 25 years before they were actually observed and measured. If science used only what is directly measurable, one could never develop either hypotheses or theory. Moreover, to reject whatever cannot be directly measured is to assume that what cannot be measured is not real, and that what is not real cannot be harmful.  Obviously, however, things not yet directly measurable can be harmful.  And if the arguments given earlier are correct, then although the ICRP (2002b, 117-119) proposes to reject whatever is not directly measurable, it is inconsistent in proposing a system in which individual doses will not be directly measured.  Instead the ICRP intends to use models, estimates, and averages to calculate individual doses.  But if so, then the ICRP has an inconsistent position on measurability as a criterion for acceptable dose.

 4.5 Misunderstanding the Simplicity Criterion
	In defending its new proposals, the ICRP claims that they represent a simpler approach to radiation protection (2002b, 113).   It also asserts that the current model-weighting factors for determining radiation dose are more complex than can be justified (122).   These and other statements, as well as the text of the new proposals, reveal that the ICRP understands simplicity in terms of expediency, facility, or ease of mathematical manipulation.  This is a peculiar notion of simplicity, however, one more related to pragmatic concerns than to defensible science.
	Among scientists, a new theory or approach satisfies the simplicity criterion and is able to replace an older theory only (a) if the newer approach has comprehensive explanatory and predictive power that is at least equal to the old approach and (b) if the newer theory has fewer variables and is more easily manipulable (see, for example, Sober 1975).  As Carl Hempel (1966, 40) put it: simplicity argues only for accepting alternative hypotheses that would account for the same phenomena.  Hence, for the ICRP to make a scientifically defensible claim that its new proposals are simpler than the current system, it must show that the new proposals are at least equal to the old ones in comprehensive explanatory and predictive power.  Yet because of the problems with incompleteness, ignoring important variables such as scale, and logical inconsistencies, the new proposals arguably have less comprehensive explanatory and predictive power than the current system of radiation protection.  In any case, the ICRP has not argued that its new proposals have the requisite comprehensive explanatory and predictive power.  One reason is that, using the PALS criterion, it acts contrary to best risk-assessment practices by reducing and comparing both voluntary and involuntary risk exposures. Assessors have repeatedly warned, in comparative risk assessment, that such reductions and comparisons are illegitimate, because dose quantity is not the only relevant variable (see Shrader-Frechette 1991). 
	Rather than employing the standard, scientifically defensible notion of simplicity, the ICRP has merely used the term, “simpler,” in a nonscientific way, in an attempt to justify a crude reduction in radiation protection.  It has a pragmatically simpler approach only because it has ignored important considerations, such as collective dose, or treated them inconsistently.

5. The 2002 ICRP Environmental Proposals
		Unfortunately the scientific methods behind the dose-response curves proposed in the 2002 draft ICRP recommendations for environmental protection are just as flawed as its 2002 proposals for human protection.  Subsequent paragraphs show that the ICRP environmental proposals (ICRP 2002a) are flawed in at least 4 ways: (1) They take an incomplete approach to ecological risk assessment.  (2) They employ arbitrary selection criteria for “reference species,” criteria that are easily manipulated and subjective. (3) They employ unclear, non-transparent techniques that are not capable of reliable replication and therefore are susceptible to subjective manipulation. (4) They reject direct measurement and exposure standards for the abiotic environment.

5.1 An Incomplete Scientific Approach to Ecological Risk Assessment (ERA)
	One of the most serious flaws in the new ICRP report is that its recommended environmental protection consists only of modeling radiation doses to several reference organisms while ignoring protection of ecosystem structures, functions, and the abiotic environment.  Although the report claims to present an overview of “ecological risk assessment” (ERA) as “based on appropriate reference species” (par. 102), the presentation mentions and employs only one of two main ERA approaches, that of toxicological risk assessment (TRA). The other main ERA approach, completely ignored in the report, is assessment of ecosystem integrity (EI).  TRA methods employ only species endpoints (doses) in assessment, analogous to human-health or toxicological risk assessment.  EI methods, such as AEA – adaptive environmental assessment (NRC 1992, esp. 345 ff.; Holling 1978; Walters 1986) or synoptic surveys (Cairns and Niederlehner 1994) – include ecosystem-function and abiotic components (see, for example, NRC 2000, esp. 24 ff.; Di Giulio and Monosson 1996).  
	Admittedly, of course, TRA is better developed than EI.  Given its limited focus, the underlying ecological theory -- necessary to understand TRA and species effects -- is more predictive than the ecological theory undergirding EI and ecosystems effects.  Hence an emphasis on TRA is understandable.  However, the ICRP report’s complete exclusion of consideration of ERA ecosystem-level effects and abiotic effects is problematic from the point of view of scientific completeness, since system-level assessment methods are well developed and being used in many of the most credible scientific communities (e.g., NRC 1999, esp. 177 ff.; NRC 1995e; NRC 1995w; NRC 1993; NRC 1992).  Indeed both US National Academy of Sciences reports (see, for example, NRC 1995e, 71 ff.; NRC 1995w, 10-11; NRC 1993, 113 ff.; NRC 1992,  289-290), as well as mainline scientific articles (see, e.g., Harding et al. 2001; Joyal et al. 2001; Welsh and Draege 2001; Cochrane 2001; Noss 1996; Cairns and Niederlehner 1994) specifically warn against focusing only on “intermediate variables” rather than also on “ecosystem effects” (NRC 1999, 180).
	If standard scientific practice includes both forms of ERA, then the report errs not only in ignoring one of them but also in suggesting that ERA, as such, focuses only on doses to reference organisms.  The main shortcoming of using only TRA, and not both TRA and EI, is not only that TRA alone is less comprehensive, but also that it is less holistic.  As the US National Academy of Sciences warned, “conservation of biological resources... entails the conservation of the physical and chemical system – landscape – upon which those resources depend” (NRC 1993, 113-114).  Conservation requires not only assessing pollution exposures to alleged representative species, as TRA does, but also EI evaluations of the physical and chemical systems on which life depends (NRC 2000, esp. 24 ff.; Di Giulio and Monosson 1996; see NRC 1994). Moreover, in presenting ERA, the ICRP report is remiss in including and focusing almost completely on unrefereed “gray” literature, used in the nuclear community, rather than also on the classic ecological articles on ERA from refereed journals in the biological and environmental sciences.
	Besides being incomplete in using only the TRA approach, the report (2002a) is scientifically misleading in not presenting an accurate account of the TRA approach it promotes.  For example, it says “both the US DOE [US Department of Energy] and the Canadian approaches also make use of some form of generic reference ‘organisms’ or entities for assessing compliance with predefined dose limits” (par. 103).  Yet the report fails to note that this reference-organism approach is only part of the requisite ecological methodology; that both nations employ standards for air and water, not merely a dose approach; and that the Canadians are perhaps the world leaders in promoting more comprehensive and holistic EI and systems approaches.  
	Despite its incomplete scientific methodology, modeled only on human-toxicology rather than also including abiotic recommendations and ecosystem methods, the ICRP report claims it aims at “an overarching, systematic approach” (ICRP 2002a, par. 127), at protection of ecosystems (pars. 74, 123), and “early” detection of environmental threats (par. 77). Yet, at the same time, it promotes use of only one narrow and limited (but helpful and necessary) dose-to-reference-organisms approach (see Berger et al 2001). Thus the report claims to do something (provide an “overarching, systematic approach”) on which it does not deliver.  

5.2 Arbitrary Selection Criteria for “Reference Species”
	Apart from its incomplete representation of ERA, the ICRP report does not present either TRA or the dose-to-species approach in its most defensible, empirical, up-to-date scientific way, perhaps in part because the report tends to rely on the nonrefereed “gray” literature rather than on the up-to-date ecological literature in the best refereed scientific journals. The ICRP report does not present its unique reference-dose approach, in the context of assessing the pros (see, for example, Lambeck 2002) and cons (see, for example, Rolstad et al 2002) of various empirical methods based, for example, on focal species, umbrella species, indicator species, or flagship species.  Instead the ICRP report uses a notion of “reference species” which it presents in an inconsistent, arbitrary, and unscientific way.  For example, the report claims, without explanation,  that its “reference” flora and fauna will be neither “average” nor “sentinel” species (ICRP 2002a, par. 111), but instead “typical” species (pars. 113, 120).  How can species be “typical” but not “average” or “sentinel”?  Moreover, of what are they typical? Of similar species, similar habitats, similar ecosystems, similar landscapes, similar nations, or what? The report neither defines the term “reference species” nor answers these questions.  
	Regarding its particular account of the “reference species” approach, the document also appears inconsistent in claiming that such “reference” species should be “typical,” yet chosen because they are those “for which we already have data on [their] doses and radiation effects” (par. 113)?  This inconsistency is particularly troubling because it suggests that the committee wishes to follow the approach of the drunk, looking for his watch under the street light.  The drunk looks for his watch (chooses reference flora and fauna) under the streetlight (among species about which there is maximum information), not because he lost it there (not because these flora and fauna are scientifically the best scientific indicators), but because under the light is the easiest place to search (the species about which, for whatever reason, there is the most information).  Good science should tell us what species to study, but the ICRP report has it backwards; it suggests that the species (about which we already have the most information) are those that should be the object of scientific assessment/regulation. 
	If the ICRP (2002a) report had recommended using the most sensitive species as reference species, then it would be clear what the selection criteria were. Moreover, if the report recommended using the most sensitive species as reference species, then any worries about the method’s underestimating species-effects of radioactive pollution would be mitigated, and the import of the recommendations would be clearer.  However, the report explicitly avoided this language (“most sensitive species”) and this recommendation.  Thus the reader is in the position of thinking that, if more sensitive species are chosen as reference species, then the recommended method might be more protective, whereas if less sensitive species are chosen, then the recommended method might be less protective of the environment.  Given the ambiguity of the report, it is possible to know neither how “reference species” should be chosen, nor whether one ought to support use of them, as opposed to signal species, indicator species, or some or vehicle for assessment.
	The ICRP dose-to-reference-organisms approach could be part of a scientifically credible protection system (1) if it used the best available ecological techniques and methods, particularly empirical methods and not merely modeled doses; (2) if its analyses were based on the best science available in the best refereed scientific journals, not merely the “gray” literature; (3) if it defined its key terms, so that criteria (such as “most sensitive species”) for choosing reference species were clear; (4) if a major determinant, for choosing species, were not merely those about which data already exist; and (5) if it included explicit analysis of the assumptions in, and shortcomings of, its special version of the “dose-to-reference-organisms” approach, relative to existing methods involving indicator species, umbrella species, keystone species, and so on.  Yet the ICRP report accomplishes none of these tasks.

5.3 Dose Models Using Analysis That Is Derivative and Not Transparent
	The ICRP report likewise appears inconsistent in listing transparency as one of its goals (ICRP 2002a, pars. 106), and in criticizing current ICRP recommendations for their lack of ”transparency” (par. 24), yet proposing a dose-to-reference- organism approach that is appears lacking in transparency.  Not only is the ICRP version of the dose approach flawed for the 5 reasons listed at the end of section 2 earlier, but it also is not transparent, not clear (see Scharfstein 1988; Dascal and Wroblewski 1988).  For one thing, on the ICRP’s own admission, its proposed approach is based “largely on models instead of on direct empirical measurements” (par. 109) and largely on non-refereed “gray” literature, rather than refereed scientific articles.  Also, instead of including recommendations for direct, transparent measures of radiological pollution of air and water (as many international environmental conventions require, as noted earlier in Section 3), the report argues for using an indirect, incomplete, nonempirical, and therefore arbitrary, estimate of pollution, namely, the human-modeled (not measured) dose to some subjectively-chosen “reference” organism.   The report recommends nontransparent methods which are not only modeled rather than empirical, and derivative or indirect rather than directly measured, but also nontransparent in a third way.  They are statistically nontransparent. The report admits that its proposed estimates of dose and pollution effects will be only “likely” (par. 110), not based on explicit confidence levels and statistically measurable uncertainty bounds.
	Moreover, the report’s proposed estimates of doses and radiation effects are nontransparent in a fourth way.  They ignore crucially important empirical measurement parameters.  In contemporary science, the most explicit, exact measure of radiation dose is genetic or chromosome effects.  Yet the report makes no recommendation for using this “gold standard” and instead says that calculated radiation doses will be based on “particular observable effects,” rather than non-observable effects, e.g., at the chromosome level (ICRP 2002a, par. 131). 
	A fifth respect in which the ICRP document is not transparent concerns its methods for selecting “reference” species, the center of its proposed approach. The report admits: “The criteria for the choice of reference organisms will have to be determined by the ICRP” (par. 128).  How can the report scientifically defend a method whose selection criteria are not specified, ahead of time, and yet claim that the method is transparent? How can scientists evaluate the adequacy of a method whose selection criteria and reference species are not specified? How can the report ignore analysis of selection criteria that are the subject of so much controversy in the refereed journal literature (see, for example, Lambreck 2002, Lindenmayer et al 2002, Rolstad et al 2002), and yet claim that its method is transparent? 
	Current limitations of ecological science also argue for more transparent radiation-protection measures in addition to those proposed in the ICRP report. The uniqueness of different biotic situations – as well as the limited numbers of controlled biotic experiments, the reliance on extrapolation, the different sensitivities of various flora and fauna, the absence of reliable biological surveys with information on all flora and fauna, and the limited understanding of ecological concepts and theories (see, for example,  NRC 2000, 1994; Shrader-Frechette and McCoy 1993, esp. 1-106) – suggest that more direct measures of radiation - e.g., for air and water – also ought to be used, to supplement any “reference” species approach.

5.4 Rejection of Primary, Empirical Exposure Measures for the Abiotic Environment
	Although the ICRP (2002a) report explicitly excludes the abiotic environment from its proposed environmental recommendations, and it presupposes that abiotic and biotic components of the environment can be handled separately, such a separation is problematic.  As already noted, the US National Academy of Sciences warned, “conservation of biological resources ... entails the conservation of the physical and chemical system – landscape – upon which those resources depend” (NRC 1993, 113-114).  Conservation requires not only assessing pollution exposures to alleged reference species, but also evaluations of the physical and chemical systems on which life depends (NRC 2000, esp. 24 ff.; Di Giulio and Monosson 1996; Elnecave et al 2001).  Besides, there are well-developed assessment methods for abiotic resources such as water (see, for example, NRC 1997, esp. 6 ff.), and ignoring protection of the abiotic environment could be especially dangerous (see Hey 1991), given the irreversible nature of much groundwater pollution and the fact that radiation effects are cumulative and additive, with no threshold for risk.
	Another reason for more direct radiological-pollution protection (for the abiotic environment) is that there is no complete and comprehensive biological survey revealing the precise distribution, number, and life-cycle characteristics of biota throughout the world, and there are no uncontroversial ecological indicators or species (NRC 2000, 1994).  Such shortcomings could be minimized, with respect to environmental protection, by including measurement of radiological pollution of air and water.  Including empirical air and water measurements, rather than only theorized or modeled dose endpoints, also is necessary because of (a) the different responses of various species to radiation, (b) the many forms in which radionuclides occur, (c) the various unknown details of exposure, and (d) the synergistic, cumulative, and indirect effects of radiation (Moeller 1997, 28) – none of which can be handled through use of only a largely-theoretical analysis of dose to some reference organism.  For instance, all international scientific bodies accept the linear, no-threshold (LNT) model of the radiation dose-response relationship.  As a result, they maintain that effects of radiation are additive and cumulative, through an organism’s lifetime, with no level of exposure that is completely risk free (see, for example, ICRP 1991; NCRP 1993; Schleien et al 1998).  Yet determining such a cumulative, lifetime, radiation dose is not possible, if one uses a purely theoretical model of reference dose that ignores measures of actual radiation exposures, particularly through internal and food-chain effects.
	Using modeled dose-to-reference organisms, alone, also is troublesome because the doses cannot be determined reliably over space and time.  As food-chain effects, migration patterns, and downwind /downstream effects become significant -- particularly in the case of long-lived radionuclides – the no-threshold, additive, and cumulative effects of radiation are likely to be significant (see, for example, Schleien et al 1998, 4-48; NCRP 1993; ICRP 1991).  As a result, the affected biotic population could be spatially ubiquitous or unknown. Effects would be almost impossible to track through many species’ cycles of birth, life, death, and decay.  But if the ICRP report also offered recommendations for air and water, however, its provisions would be easier to follow, more transparent through time, more holistic in including the abiotic environment, and less dependent on anthropogenic assumptions and models.  Yet the ICRP report ignores such recommendations.

6. Other Alternatives
	Given the preceding problems with both the 2002 ICRP PALS and environmental proposals, are there other alternatives to radiation protection that the ICRP (2002a; 2002b) reports ought to include?  This last section of the paper outlines a more comprehensive set of recommendations for radiological protection of both humans and the environment and for reforms in scientific methods which the ICRP could recommend.	




(1)	ALARA recommendations, as already mandated by ICRP (1991) for human protection, or else arguments defending ICRP’s omitting ALARA in its 2002 proposals;
(2)	Optimization of protection (pollution-prevention) recommendations, as already mandated by ICRP (1991) for human protection, or else arguments defending ICRP’s omitting optimizing environmental protection;
(3)	Abiotic-, including air- and water-protection, recommendations, already in international law, or else arguments defending their omission by ICRP;
(4)	Recommendations for developing and implementing techniques of ecosystem-level assessment, as in EI, as already mandated in international law, or else arguments defending their omission by ICRP;
(5)	Recommendations that include (a) precise definitions of “reference” species, (b) their criteria for selection, (c) directives to employ measured, rather than modeled doses and, where measured doses are not available, directives to obtain such measurements; (d) requests for reference-species lists from major national/international ecological associations, or arguments defending ICRP’s omission of (a) - (d) (see NRC 1996);
(6)	Recommendations for avoiding logical and ethical problems with PALS, if the report endorses PALS, or else arguments defending ICRP’s omission of responses to PALS deficiencies (see NRC 1996);
(7)	Recommendations formulated in terms of the best available empirical research in refereed scientific journals, especially ecology and medical journals.
	
The methodological reforms in the science that is included in the ICRP report include practicing and recommending more inclusive ecological risk assessment and more empirical measures of dose. Moreover, because simplicity, transparency, and objectivity are the hallmarks of good science, ICRP scientists ought to recommend inclusion of more direct measures of empirical endpoints, such as air and water concentrations of radionuclides, and not merely derivative, calculated, or theorized doses to arbitrarily-selected organisms or to “average” humans.  All science at the service of policymaking also should use the best available techniques to evaluate human-health, abiotic, and ecosystem effects of pollution and not merely effects on “average” people or on other biota.  Given new pollution-prevention technology, arguably no amounts of radiation exposure should automatically be considered “negligible,” as the ICRP (2002b) report claims, unless it is nonpreventable. 

7. Conclusion
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